Chapter One: The Signal — In 2007, I Discovered That the Nation Pursues Long-Term Value

Chapter One: The Signal — In 2007, I Discovered That the Nation Pursues Long-Term Value This conviction can be traced back to 2006 at the earliest. In the spring of that year, I joined Dun'an Group, serving as the financial head for the three northeastern provinces. At that time, Dun'an was one of China's top 500 private enterprises, with businesses spanning refrigeration, real estate, new energy, and many other sectors. But what truly helped me find my direction was not those grand strategic plans, but two seemingly trivial incidents. I. A Loophole That Had Lasted Fifty-Four Years Not long after I joined, I discovered an unusual fine record during an audit. A subsidiary of the company had been levied stamp duty by the tax bureau, and fined, for a contract to purchase land use rights. The amount was not large — just over eighty thousand yuan. I have an almost obsessive sensitivity to tax law. Every tax levied must have a clear legal basis. I immediately opened the Provisional Regulations on Stamp Duty and checked the provisions one by one. Stamp duty law has a distinctive feature: it operates on a "positive list" — only the contracts explicitly listed in the law are taxable. Purchase and sale contracts are taxed, processing contracts are taxed, property leasing contracts are taxed — but after combing through all the provisions, I could not find "contracts for the purchase of land use rights." Since the law had no such provision, why was it being taxed? On what grounds was the fine imposed? I consulted all the local accounting firms in Shenyang and received astonishingly consistent replies: "Once stamp duty is paid, it cannot be refunded. This is industry practice. Don't waste your effort." But I refused to believe that industry practice could override the law. In an era when the internet was not yet widespread, I scoured countless pages on the State Administration of Taxation's website, and finally found a vague lead in an inconspicuous corner: according to a certain document from 1952, contracts for the transfer of land use rights were not within the scope of stamp duty. Following this lead, I began a lengthy search. Eventually, I found that original document from 1952. It was a mimeographed sheet, its paper yellowed and brittle with age, but the words on it were crystal clear: contracts for the transfer of land use rights are not within the scope of stamp duty. Holding this document, I went to the Shenyang Local Taxation Bureau, which was in charge of stamp duty. The section chief responsible for land-related taxation glanced at the date on the document and dismissed it outright: "1952? This is 2006 now! You're telling me to grant a refund based on something from fifty-four years ago? Absolutely impossible." I was rejected. But I did not back down. I was not trying to prove how capable I was; I simply held firm to a simple logic: what the law does not stipulate cannot be levied. Rules are rules, and should apply equally to enterprises and tax authorities. If rules could be interpreted arbitrarily, the market would lose its certainty. I turned instead to the Shenhe District Tax Office, which had jurisdiction over the enterprise. From summer to winter, I used my spare time to visit the tax office again and again, bringing documents, explaining the logic, and providing leads. My persistence eventually moved Director Hou, who was willing to help me search the internal archives. Finally, in the tax bureau's archive room, we found the decisive evidence — in a compilation of tax laws and regulations from past years, it was written in black and white: according to the 1952 document, the purchase and sale of land use rights does not incur stamp duty. With this official basis, the Shenhe District Tax Office formally accepted the refund application. Around the 2007 Spring Festival, the over eighty thousand yuan in tax and late payment surcharges was fully refunded to the company's account. And then something even more astonishing happened. Around the time of the refund, the state officially initiated the revision process for the stamp duty regulations. In 2007, the state formally abolished the old 1952 provision and explicitly added a clause in the new stamp duty law: contracts for the purchase of land use rights are subject to stamp duty. A legal loophole that had persisted for fifty-four years was thoroughly closed. From discovering the loophole, to the arduous appeal, to the tax refund, to the national law revision — this was a complete closed loop. This incident left me with an extremely profound impression: the nation pursues long-term value. It was willing to correct a mistake that had lasted fifty-four years, willing to listen to voices from the grassroots, and willing to respond to the test of practice with institutional improvement. This courage for self-innovation made me feel, for the first time so vividly, that this country would certainly grow stronger and stronger. II. Not Even One Yuan Could Be Paid During the same period, another incident deepened my understanding of "rules." At the time, I also oversaw the finances of a commercial operations management company under Dun'an Group. The company was in its development phase — having just purchased land and still under construction — and had no operating revenue whatsoever. According to tax law, zero filing is a legal right of the enterprise — with no income, there is naturally no tax to pay. However, the tax environment at the time had an unwritten rule: zero filing was not allowed. The head of the tax office came directly to me and said: "There are requirements from above. Zero filing is not permitted. Even paying one yuan would do — surely the company isn't so short that it can't even pay one yuan?" I replied to him clearly: "Not even one yuan can be paid. If I pay this tax, you will have a problem too. You would not be acting in accordance with the tax law; that would be a violation. I cannot let you get into trouble. So I cannot give you even one cent." I knew full well that I was protecting him, and also upholding the seriousness of the rules. If I paid one yuan just to satisfy a bureaucratic request, it might seem trivial, but the logic was wrong. Once a wrong thing begins, there will be a second time, a third time, and over time, the rules become a dead letter. III. The Signal of That Year 2007 was an immensely important year in my life. That year, I personally delivered a fifty-four-year legal loophole to its end. That year, I saw with my own eyes a nation willing to correct, refine, and upgrade its own institutions. That year, I realized clearly for the first time: a nation that pursues long-term value is laying a solid foundation for its future takeoff. From 2008 onward, the nation's approach to policy underwent profound changes — no longer content with issuing notices as patches, but building a comprehensive institutional framework designed for the long term. Fiscal and tax system reforms, strengthened financial regulation, standardization of the capital market — what I saw was a nation using institutional strength to pave the way for the future. That experience was like a watershed. Before it, I was merely a financial professional. After it, my horizons were opened. I no longer looked only at how much money a single enterprise could make, but at what a nation was pursuing, what a market believed in, and how an institution was evolving. I thought then that China would certainly rise, but the world was not yet ready to accept it. For our enterprises to earn respect on the global stage, economic scale alone was not enough — they also needed an institutional foundation and data transparency that could withstand scrutiny. This conviction became the deepest underpinning of all my subsequent practice and research. From that moment on, I knew what I was going to do with my life. I was not just doing a job; I was paving a path to the world for Chinese enterprises.